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Globalization and the Legitimacy of International
Telecommunications Standard-Setting
Organizations
KRISHNA JAYAKAR"
In a 1991 article, Stanley Besen and Joseph Farrell, two well-known
economists, put forward the opinion that the preeminence of the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in international telecommunications
standardization was soon comingto an end.' Since its founding in 1865 in Paris
as the International Telegraph Union, the ITU has been a major forum for
international telecommunications standardization,2  along with other
organizations like the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The ITU/ISO-IEC
system evolved into a comprehensive and elaborate process for standardization
that worked effectively for more than a century. However, as the transition to
a global information society accelerated in the 1980s, dissatisfaction with the
time-consuming and contentious standard-setting process in the ITU began to
rise. The creation of Regional Standards Organizations (RSOs) like the
Standards Committee TI of the United States, the Japanese
Telecommunications Technology Committee (TTC), and the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was symptomatic of this
dissatisfaction. Besen and Farrell argued that the rise of more efficient
alternative organizational structures challenged the preeminence of the ITU as
a standard-setter.
The on-going contest between the ITU and RSOs is an interesting
illustration of the challenges and conflicts inherent in globalization. As a body
created by the cooperative efforts of states and dominated by national
* Krishna Jayakar is a doctoral candidate at the Department ofTelecommunications at Indiana University,
Bloomington. He has worked as a research officer for the Indian government's Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, and as an associate instructor at Indiana University. His research interests include international
telecommunications, infrastructure policies, and media economics.
1. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, The Role of the TU in Standardization: Pre-eminence,
Impotence or Rubber Stamp, 15 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y, 311, 320 (1991).
2. For an excellent and concise history of the ITU, see George A. Codding, The International
Telecommunications Union: 130 Years of Telecommunications Regulation, 23 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
501 (1995).
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governments or their nominees, the ITU is a typical international organization.
On the other hand, RSOs are the product of a new wave of market led change
transforming our world. This comment focuses on the conflict between these
two formations in the field of international telecommunications standard-setting
in the context of globalization. Its primary concern is the ITU and the reform
of its standard-setting process in response to rapid changes in the environment
of international telecommunications. Four questions are discussed in the
following paragraphs. What are the major changes in the technological and
economic environment of international telecommunications? How have these
changes affected the demands placed on a global standardization regime for
telecommunications? How well does the ITU compare with its competitors in
standard-setting? Does Besen and Farrell's prediction about the end of the
ITU's preeminence in telecommunications standardization still hold five years
after it was made?
These four questions will be considered in the following order. The first
section will set the context for the comment by discussing globalization,
regionalization, and the legitimacy of international decision processes. In the
second section, recent changes in international telecommunications are
discussed, including convergence, deregulation, and demonopolization. The
third section outlines the standardization regime as it existed before
globalization and the changes that globalization caused. The fourth section will
discuss the standard-setting process in the ITU and the procedural modifications
introduced in it during the 1980s and the 1990s to accommodate the needs of
the information economy. The processes used in some selected "new" standard-
setting organizations will also be discussed. Aside from the ITU, three other
organizations are considered in this section: a national-level agency, Japan's
TTC; a regional standards organization, the ETSI; and an international
professional association, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
Along with the ITU, these three agencies represent all major categories of
standard-setting bodies. The fifth and final section will discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of the ITU's standard-setting process in light of the discussions
in the preceding sections.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION
It is an undisputable fact that we are living in a much more interconnected
and interdependent world than ever before. Consider instant communication
and easy travel among different parts of the world; the intensity and scale of
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international trade and financial transfers; the operations of multinational
corporations and giant global media conglomerates; increasing cultural
homogenization, especially among youth; and the rise of pan-national non-
governmental organizations. These have all been cited as evidence of the
globalization of political, social, and economic life in the closing decades of the
twentieth century. In fact, "globalization" has become a buzz word in policy
circles, the media, and academia.
In spite of the ubiquity of the term "globalization", there is little consensus
on its definition. Is it a new way of organizing our collective existence and the
relationships between states and societies, or the continuation of a trend a long
time in the making? One ofthe best available definitions of globalization is the
"denationalization of markets, laws and politics, in the sense of interlacing
peoples and individuals for the sake of the common good."'
Two significant ideas are raised by this definition. First, globalization
involves the "denationalization" ofactivities formerly considered the exclusive
domain of the state, like making laws and administering markets. Globalization
is thus different from internationalization, a term that signifies the "cooperative
activities of national actors, public or private, on a level beyond the nation-
state, but in the last resort under its control."4 International organizations
supplement the powers of national governments when they need to undertake
activities that are beyond their own capabilities or to which they are not
inclined. Globalization, on the other hand, unleashes alternative loci of power
and influence beyond the states and the international organizations created by
them. This is an important distinction.
The second notable feature of the above definition of globalization is its
identification ofa "common good" for all humankind. The long-existing system
of nation-states cannot conceive ofa "common good" of all humankind beyond
the one arising out of the interaction of different, and sometimes conflicting,
"national interests." According to the above definition, globalization tries to go
beyond these separate national interests to identify the interests of the global
community. The definition creates a global "public sphere" where different
viewpoints are expressed. Some argue that the proliferation of global media
and increasing interaction between policymakers and ordinary people in
different countries through tourism, business travel, and communication has
3. Jost Delbrack, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law: A
European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993).
4. Id.
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already constituted this public space.' We will return to the issue of the
common good in our discussion of the legitimacy of global decisionmaking.
Multiple factors are responsible for the globalizing tendencies active today.
There is obviously the need to confront pressing global problems like
international peace and security, underdevelopment, environmental protection,
and mass migration that are beyond the competence of any one nation to tackle
and need the collective action of the international community. However
important these issues may be, market capitalism operates to create the
structural environment and provide the primary impetus for globalization.
Some of these globalizing economic tendencies include the fluid movement of
the locus of production following lower input costs, intensified competition in
national markets between local and foreign firms, new forms of collaborative
activities like contract manufacturing and joint ventures between firms in
different countries, faster technology transfer, diffusion of new production
techniques, and, above all, the intensified flows of international finance
following the day-to-day fluctuation of interest rates.6
The economic roots of globalization have led some to suggest that markets
are gaining the upper hand over the state in the eternal struggle between the two.
As evidence, they cite the "denationalization" inherent in globalization and the
rise of new non-state actors on the international scene. Countries around the
world have deregulated, privatized, and liberalized their domestic markets and
economic institutions since the 1980s. In the previous nation-state system,
international organizations were derivative of the nation-state and drew their
authority from the principle of state sovereignty. Now, new non-state actors are
taking over functions that were previously reserved for the state. Among these
are non-governmental organizations like Greenpeace and the International Red
Cross and technical bodies like the Internet Society. The Internet Society is
especially interesting because it is a loosely constituted, inclusive, and
participatory body that sets -its own agenda and derives its authority only from
the quality of its regulatory output.
One effect of globalization has been to place an increasing portion of
economic activity beyond state regulatory authority. Some have even gone so
far as to suggest the demise of the state system or at least a reduction in state
5. Some would also argue that the global public space suffers from genuine problems of equity because
not all individuals, communities, and states have equal access to it. This issue, however, is beyond the scope
of this comment.
6. See S. Tamer Cavusgil, Globalization of Markets and Its Impact On Domestic Institutions, I IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (1993).
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autonomy in favor of the increasing power of markets. An alternate view is that
states are not being overwhelmed by markets, but that the two are entering into
a new partnership for mutual advantage. The Japanese have pioneered a close
relationship between the state and powerful corporations, the kieretsu, in which
the two collaborate to capture international markets and minimize the impact of
foreign competition in their own domestic market. The phenomenal success of
the Japanese industrial machine has induced many other countries to emulate the
Japanese model. Strategic trade policies in which governments take actions
designed to favor their own "lead industries" and make them internationally
competitive are now commonplace.!
A trend that supports this alternate view is that states are not merging into
the global marketplace but are agglomerating into regional trading blocs in
search of international comparative advantage. Well-established regional
arrangements like ASEAN and the European Community, and emerging
groupings like NAFTA and APEC, are now relatively common. Within these
trading blocs, states have progressively lowered tariffs for intraregional trade
and permitted the free movement of capital, labor, and finished commodities.
Additionally, they harmonized their regulatory standards for production,
environmental protection, and quality control. At the same time, regional
groupings have mandated barriers to external trade so that their internal markets
remain protected for intraregional firms. Though the erection of these external
trade barriers is contrary to the spirit of international trade agreements like
GATT, the global trading regime accommodated these regional groupings.
Some have qualified the actions of national governments and regional
trading blocs as a form of "neo-mercantilism" defining it as "current rent-
seeking practices in which businesses become allied with the state against the
public ...[using] trade rules and regulations that serve the interests of
producers, intermediaries, and the state, at the expense and sufferance of
7. In spite of its free market protestations, the United States has subsidized or otherwise aided its large
corporations. Witness the SEMATECH experiment, the bail-out of Chrysler corporation, and the HDTV
standard-setting exercise. For a detailed study ofthe dynamics of industrial policymaking in the high technology
industries, see Chris Thorn, State Involvement in the Semiconductor Industry: The Role and Importance of
Consortia, in HELMUT WILLKE ETAL., BENEVOLENTCONSPIRACIEs: THE ROLEOFENABLINGTECHNOLOGIES IN
THE WELFARE OF NATIONS: THE CASES OF SDI, SEMATECH, AND EUREKA 41 (1995).
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consumers."" States and regional groupings can choose to use tariff barriers,
which are in considerable international disgrace, or the more subtle non-tariff
barriers like import quotas, national subsidies, and barriers to investment and
profit repatriation. Howard Barnes draws an explicit parallel between the
medieval guild system and modem standards stating that "the existence of state-
sponsored standards creates entry-barriers against the intrusion [of] outsiders.'"
Standards are interpreted here as a non-tariff barrier, a point to which we will
return later in this paper.
While it is possible to look at regional blocs as protean global governments,
some writers assert that regionalization is the readjustment of the nation-state
system to the transformation of the world economy. That "the world economy
fragmented into regional blocs is the reassertion of the role of the nation-state
in regulating international economic relations."'" Others point out that the
emerging regional groupings in North America, Europe, and East Asia are
centered around dominant economies, like the United States, Germany, and
Japan. "[T]he new political regionalism ... expresses different norms, which,
in the foreseeable future, are unlikely to be assimilated fully into one normative
global order."" The creation of regional groupings is not leading to the
homogenization of national corporate cultures into a global economic system,
but is leading to the propagation of a dominant economy's economic models
within a restricted area of influence.
In spite of all the talk about globalization, the "denationalization of political
and economic life" and the identification of a "common global good" are far
from being realized at present. Many sectors of economic activity are not as
firmly within the control of the state as they were in the past, but the state is
attempting to capture lost ground by constructing relatively autonomous
regional groupings. Globalization, as defined in the paragraphs above, is still
a work in progress. The prevailing reality of our times is better explained by the
term "regionalization."
8. HOWARDW. BARNES,THEROOTSOFNEO-MERCANTILISM 3 (1992). Note that Barnes' definition of
neo-mercantilism seems to indicate that the only way states aid their lead industries is through restricting
imports, thereby insulating the domestic market from foreign competition. Yet a comprehensive discussion of
neo-mercantilistic actions has to include a discussion of the export promotion activities of the government.
9. Id. at5.
10. Wieslaw Michalak, The PoliticalEconomy of Trading Blocs, in CONTINENTALTRADING BLOCS: THE
GROWTH OF REGIONALISM IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 37, 65 (Richard Gibb & Wieslaw Michalak eds., 1994).
11. Peter J. Katzenstein,A WorldofRegions: America, Europe, and EastAsia, I IND..GLBALLEOAL
STUD. 65, 65 (1993).
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In the nation-state system, state governments and international
organizations derived the legitimacy of their actions from the principle of state
sovereignty. According to this view, states have the sovereign right to order
their internal affairs without interference from outside and to interact with other
nations on the basis of equality. International organizations also derived their
authority from the principle of state sovereignty. Though in practice there were
wide disparities between states in power, economic strength, and influence, the
principle of state sovereignty gave a framework within which international
relations could be conducted. Globalization called this assumption into
question. By reducing the autonomous decisionmaking power of the state, and
by presenting the normative alternative of world government, the globalization
hypothesis has raised questions about both the practicality and the desirability
of continued reliance on the principle of state sovereignty. However, an
alternative conception of legitimacy in international relations has
yet to evolve.
Two choices are available to the international community, inspired by
capitalism and democracy. First, liberal economists point to the self-regulating,
self-perpetuating nature of the market system. According to this view, the
operations of unrestricted markets throw up "natural" solutions that are
superior to those generated through state intervention. Since the current phase
of globalization arose out of the operation of international market capitalism,
the institutions and decisionmaking processes generated by globalization should
be intrinsically legitimate. Thus, the role of governments is to reduce its
interference in markets and to integrate domestic economies with the global
economy.
The second potential source of legitimacy for globalization is centered upon
broad-based participation in decisionmaking processes inspired by the ideal of
participatory democracy. According to this ideal, a "global associational
revolution"'2 needs to arise out of increased people-to-people contact, the
development of new communication technologies, and the desire of people to act
en masse in areas that state governments are reluctant to enter. This approach
stresses the activities of non-governmental organizations, consumer groups, and
public-spirited individuals in influencing national and international decisions.
Benjamin Barber, for example, argues for the creation of a global civil society
12. U.N. COMMISSION ON GLOBALGOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBALNEIGHBORHOOD, THE REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 253 (1995).
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through democracy and institution-building. 3 According to Barber, global
democracy has to precede a global law. Supporters of the global civil society
argument require more broad-based participation in institutional decisionmaking
than a system based on state sovereignty permitted.
These two legitimizing principles, markets and participatory
decisionmaking, are not always mutually compatible. For example, the interests
of large corporations are often diametrically opposed to those of their
consumers. The market principle will favor a decisionmaking system in which
large, and presumably more economically efficient, corporations play an
important role. Conversely, the participatory decisionmaking principle will
oppose this and give more credence to decisions arrived at through a more
broad-based approach. As the international telecommunications standardization
regime searches for an alternative to the system based on state sovereignty, the
question of legitimacy will confront it. In the next few paragraphs, we will
consider the transformation of international telecommunication under the
influence of technological, regulatory, and economic changes, in order to lay the
groundwork for an understanding of the changed demands placed upon the
telecommunications standardization regime.
II. PARADIGM SHIFT IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
From the early days of the telegraph, telecommunications has been
generally carried on as an activity under the strict control and supervision of the
state. Even in the United States, where the ownership of communication
networks or broadcasting has been vested in the private sector, the state has
claimed the rightto regulate these activities on the basis of the public interest. 4
State control over broadcasting and telecommunications was a manifestation of
the principle of state sovereignty.
Second, economists have pointed out the economies of scale and scope in
telecommunications networks, resulting in the well-established principle that
telecommunications is a natural monopoly. In practice, states often preserved
the telecommunications sector as a monopoly under the control of either the
public sector or, as in the case of the United States, a private corporation like
AT&T. In return for monopoly privileges, telecommunications service
providers were expected to maintain a certain quality of service and price, and
13. BENJAMN BARBER, JIHAD VS. McWoRLD (1995).
14. See generally ITEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDoM (1983).
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to contribute to socially beneficial objectives like universal telephone service.
Third, the regulatory regime for telecommunications was marked by a
number of arbitrary separations, which began to make less and less sense with
the advance of technology. For example, a clear regulatory distinction was
made between wireline communication and radio transmission. At the national
level, separate agencies or different wings of regulatory authorities dealt with
standards issues in wireline and radio communications. For example, in the
United States, separate bureaus of the FCC deal with broadcasting and common
carrier issues. At the international level, the ITU had two separate sectors to
deal with wireline and spectrum-based technologies: the International
Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) and the
International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR). The ITU Constitution
specifically excluded radio communication from thejurisdiction of the CCITT,
which is placed under the purview of the CCIR. 5 Similarly, when data
communications first appeared, it was separated in regulatory terms from voice
communications. While the ITU has traditionally concerned itself with the
international aspects of voice telephony, policymaking in computer-based
communication and information technology was dominated by organizations
like the ISO and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
In the 1980s and 1990s, this regulatory separation began to change. Of
primary importance were new technological possibilities like digitization and
data transmission. 6 Once it became possible to digitize information from a
variety of information appliances and transmit it over the same communication
media, the regulatory separation of data communication and voice telephony
made very little sense. Technology has made it possible to provide two or more
services like computer-mediated communications, telephone service,
broadcasting, and personal communication services over the same
communication medium. This phenomenon is commonly known as
technological convergence.
15. See ANDREW MACPHERSON, INTERNATIONALTELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS
(1990).
16. A concise discussion ofthe technological aspects ofthe "communications revolution" is available from
John E. Midwinter, Convergence of Telecommunications, Cable, and Computers in the 21st Century: A
Personal View of the Technology, in CROSSROADS ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY: CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERSITY IN COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 19 (nstitute for Information Studies ed., 1995).
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Modifications in business practices have accompanied technological
changes in telecommunications. 7 Technology presented telecommunications
service providers with both opportunities and threats. On the positive side,
telecommunications has been one of the most active growth sectors in the global
marketplace. Technological convergence also makes it possible for
telecommunications companies to benefit from enhanced economies of scope
through the provision of multiple services. On the negative side, the scale of
network investments necessary in the multiple services environment has
increased manifold. The result has been an intensification of competitive
pressures. In response, telecommunications companies enter into more mergers,
takeovers, international expansions, and price competitions than ever before.
They are also participating in more strategic alliances and partnerships to
exploit strengths and to present a more competitive profile in national markets.
Many of these alliances cut across national borders. Notable examples are the
on-going negotiations between British Telecom and MCI, and the France
Telecom-Deutsche Telekom-U.S. Sprint alliance.'8
Though made possible by technological advances, the business practices
described above would not have occurred without an accompanying shift in the
regulatory attitudes of national governments. In the early 1980s, Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher initiated a movement toward economic
conservatism in their countries. Under the influence of these charismatic
leaders, the regulatory philosophy of these countries changed to advocate free
markets and lean government. Regulatory controls over public utility
companies including telecommunications providers were reduced, state owned
enterprises were selectively privatized, and the state relaxed its control over
economic activity. These changes permitted telecommunications companies to
freely pursue the competitive business activities described in the above
paragraph.
Before the 1980s, Post, Telegraph, and Telephone (PT&T) administrations
provided most telecommunications services. PT&T administrations usually
enjoyed a monopoly in their national markets and were mostly government
owned. A notable exception was AT&T in the United States, which was a
privately owned monopoly. The cumulative effects of the technological,
17. See Robert Crandall, Economic Impetus for Convergence in Telecommunications, in CROSSROADS
ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY, supra note 16, at 15.
18. For a good discussion of the international telecommunications alliances in Europe, see Cornelius
Graak, Telecom Operators in the European Union: Internationalization Strategies and Network Alliances,
20 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 341, 341-55 (1996).
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economic, and regulatory trends on the PT&Ts have been identified:
corporatization; changing the status of PT&Ts from administrative agency to
state-owned operating company; and privatization, transferring ownership of
PT&Ts to the private sector. 9 In the United States, the AT&T divestiture
ended the dominant status of that company and created space in national
telecommunications for new players.. The changes in Europe and North
America are setting the example for national systems elsewhere as they integrate
into the global marketplace.
The standardization regime was premised on state sovereignty. Naturally,
when the telecommunications environment changed in response to the
globalizing tendencies described above, the standardization regime was put
under considerable strain. The next section describes how the demands placed
on international standard-setting changed in recent years in response to
globalization.
III. CHANGES IN THE STANDARDIZATION REGIME
Standardization is the process through which compatibility between
different functional elements is realized. 0 Compatibility may involve physical
operation, as in the case of audio cassettes and players, and communication
compatibility, such as computer protocols that enable two computers to
exchange data. It may also include design convention, which has no functional
utility, but adds convenience to transactions.
There are five processes by which standardization is achieved."' First, there
is standardization by the internal decision of firms. Second, standards may
emerge out of mutual agreement between different firms. Third, de facto
standards are set by an industry leader, which are then adopted by the entire
industry. Defacto standards also emerge from competition between firms,
when one standard achieves a predominant market share over its competitors.
Typically, a product or service is introduced into the market by the innovator,
19. These terms were used to describe the transformation of European PT&T organizations, but they are
universally applicable. Laurence Caby & Charles Steinfield, Trends in the Liberalization of European
Telecommunications: Community Harmonization and National Divergence, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
TRANSITON: POLICIES, SERvIcEs, ANDTEcHNoLooIES INTHEEuROPEANCOMMUNrTY 36,36 (Charles Steinfield,
et al. eds., 1994).
20. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Competition, Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of
Horses, Penguins and Lemmzngs, in PRODUCTSTANDARDIZATIONANDCOMPETrTIVE STRATEGY I, 1 (H.L. Gabel
ed., 1987).
21. Id. at 1-10.
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achieves wide-spread acceptability, and is then recognized as a standard for the
whole industry. Fourth, the government, usually a regulatory agency, may set
standards for the entire industry. Finally, international organizations introduce
standards through specialized agencies like the CCIR and CCITt of the ITU.
Standards set by government or international agencies are called de jure
standards.
As the telecommunications revolution has gained strength, the demands
placed upon the international standardization regime have changed. In the early
days oftelecommunications, national systems evolved independently with little
interconnection or exchange of equipment. Standards were not an important
issue at this stage, because of the primitive state of the technology, the relatively
low level of investments in infrastructure, and the lack of interconnection.
However, as the geographical scope of networks expanded in the twentieth
century, it became necessary to specify certain minimum requirements and
operational conditions to enable systems to interconnect and interoperate with
one another. At this stage, it was possible for a dominant industry leader or
technology monopolist to set the standard for the whole world. For example,
the Marconi Company set global standards for radio communication
equipment.2 Market dominance was most influential in standard setting. This
evolutionary, bottom-up model of standard-setting has been called defacto
standard-setting. During this period, the government's role in standard-setting
was relatively less important than market forces.
As telecommunications networks continued to expand, standards
coordination among different jurisdictions became necessary. National
governments and monopoly PT&Ts became involved in standard setting at the
domestic and international levels. State-owned PT&Ts and private monopolists
like AT&T effectively set the national standards for telecommunications and
participated in international negotiations on behalf of their countries. The
membership of international standard-setting organizations reflected this
national orientation. Membership in the ITU was restricted to national PT&Ts
and Recognized Private Operating Agencies (RPOAs) nominated by national
governments. Only national standard-setting institutions, one from each
22. See JAMES G. SAVAGE, THEPoLmcs OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 31-33
(1989).
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country, could be members in the ISO.23 This national orientation clearly
differentiated standard-setting at the national and international levels.24
Since wireline communication, radio transmission, and computers had
different regulatory schemes, the standards issues in these areas were also
handled by separate agencies or different divisions within the same regulatory
agency at both the international and national levels. While the ITU has
traditionally concerned itself with standardization issues in voice telephony and
broadcasting, standardization in computer-based communication and
information technology is dominated by organizations like the ISO and the IEC.
Within the ITU, separate sections deal with wireline and spectrum-based
technologies: the CCITT and the CCIR. At the national level, an example is
the FCC's separation of the bureaus dealing with broadcasting and common-
carrier regulation.
The prime requirement of the standardization regime at this stage involved
the stability of standards. Standardization, especially at the international level,
typically required a complex negotiation process to obtain consensus among all
the participants. This was a time-consuming process. For example, the
standard-setting process in the ITU took anywhere from eighteen months to
eight years to produce a final standard." As a result, standards were expected
to have a "shelf life" commensurate with the international community's efforts
in formulating the standard.
The telecommunications revolution placed a new set of demands on the
standardization regime. Foremost among the factors that led to this revolution
was technology. With convergence and the proliferation of networked
technologies, new devices and services are required to interface and interoperate
with a larger number of different telecommunication systems. While the
traditional system emphasized stability of standards, the emerging requirement
is for speed and flexibility to accommodate the rapid change in
telecommunications technology. Also, entering the market with a new product
or service exposes the fallibility of the market system. Because the new service
or device must interface with an ever-larger number of existing networks and
applications, standardization and compatibility must be introduced into the
design process. Thus, from retrospective or evolutionary standardization
23. MACPHERSON, supra note 15, at 16, 96.
24. William J. Drake, The Transformation of International Telecommunication Standardization:
European and Global Dimensions, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION, supra note 19, at 71.
25. See SAVAGE, supra note 22, at 168.
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through the market, the industry is moving toward prospective or top-down
standardization as part ofthe design process. Standardization has become more
technology-driven than market-driven. In an earlier era, it was possible for a
company like Marconi to dominate awhole industry and set standards globally.
In the more competitive, new technology era, it is not possible for any one
corporation or state to secure the market advantage to set standards unilaterally.
In addition to technology, regulatory changes also affected the
standardization regime. The deregulation and demonopolization of national
telecommunications systems effectively ended the domination of national
PT&Ts over standardization. With liberalization, demonopolization, and
deregulation, a number of new players have entered the field of
telecommunications. These novices often demanded and secured for themselves
a place at the table in standard-setting negotiations. Now, one national
organization cannot dominate the international level, nor unilaterally set
standards at the national level. For example, before 1984, AT&T set the
standards for the whole U.S. telecommunications system. Now its ability to do
so is seriously limited.
A third major trend that has shaped international standardization is the
regionalization of global markets. With the growth of regional organizations
like the European Union, ASEAN, and NAFTA, the global marketplace has
been carved up into regional blocs. As intra-regional trade and commerce
intensified, officials felt that standard setting was being used as a trade barrier
limiting the inter-regional flows of goods and services. U.S. officials for
instance have contended that European states are using their numerical strength
in international fora to get crucial standards decisions set in their favor. In
reply, the Europeans point out that the United States rarely adopts technical
legislation in conformity with global standards. American efforts in high
technology areas like Open Networks Architecture, HDTV, and ISDN proceed
independently of international efforts and embody a different set of standards.
Thus, both sides use the standard-setting process to secure relative economic
advantage."
The rise of regional standards organizations like ETSI, the Japanese TTC,
and the American TI Committee have to be viewed in the context of the
regionalization of world trade. Regional groupings are increasingly setting up
26. RAYMOND AKWULE, GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS THE TECHNOLOGY, ADMINISTRATION AND
POLICIES 113-120 (1992).
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intra-group standard-setting institutions that bypass existing global
organizations.
A significant feature of RSOs is that they are dominated by economically
developed countries. Even in the past, the developing countries had limited
presence and authority in the technical decisionmaking of the ITU, because of
the highly knowledge-intensive nature ofthe deliberations." However, they had
succeeded in turning their numerical strength to their advantage in ITU's
political decisionmaking fora like the Plenipotentiary Conferences and the
Administrative Conferences. The RSOs do not offer mechanisms to
accommodate the needs of the developing world. A polycentered standard-
setting regime is likely to reduce the negotiating power of the developing
countries even more.
IV. TRADITIONAL STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS VERSUS RSOs
The changed requirements placed upon the international standardization
regime have contributed to the rise of RSOs. In many ways these new
competitors to the ITU are faster and more efficient as standard-setters.
However, the ITU has made significant changes to its standard-setting processes
in recent years. In this section, I will examine the standard-setting processes in
the ITU, including recent changes, and compare them to those of some
important RSOs.
A. Standard-Setting in the TU
The ITU mandate for international telecommunications standardization
arises out of provisions in its constitution that it should "facilitate the worldwide
standardization of telecommunications, with a satisfactory quality of service."'2
In addition, the ITU has important responsibilities in radio-frequency
coordination and telecommunications development. The main decisionmaking
body of the ITU is the Plenipotentiary Conference which meets every four
27. See SAVAGE, supra note 22, at 169-70, 181.
28. Constitution of the International Telecommunications Union, Dec. 22, 1992, ch. i, art. 1, §2 (c),
reprinted in CONSTITUTION AND CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-34, at 21 (2d Sess. 1996).
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years. 9 The ITU also arranges periodic Administrative Conferences where it
is responsible for creating and amending the Administrative Regulations, the
compendium of operational and procedural rules for the ITU and its organs.
The Administrative Regulations are binding on all members and comprise the
International Telecommunications Regulations and the Radio Regulations. The
Plenipotentiary Conference authorizes World Radiocommunication
Conferences, World Telecommunications Standardization Conferences, and
World Telecommunications Development Conferences in between
Plenipotentiary Conferences to consider special questions in their respective
areas.
30
Aside from these generalized, deliberative bodies, there are also specialized
sections offering technical advice to the ITU. These are staffed by elected full-
time officials and staff members selected for their knowledge of different
aspects oftelecommunications. The two most important of these bodies are the
Council, the members of which are elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference
on the basis of regional representation, and the General Secretariat. The
Secretary-General is the chief executive of the ITU and is elected by the
Plenipotentiary Conference. Other offices are the Radio Regulations Board,
formerly the International Frequencies Registration Board (IFRB), and the
bureaus for radiocommunication, telecommunications standardization, and
telecommunications development.
ITU activities are divided into the radio communications, standardization,
and development sectors. The duties of the telecommunications standardization
sector are described in Chapter III of the ITU Constitution and Chapter I,
Section 6 of the Convention. The sector works through world
telecommunications standardization conferences, telecommunications
standardization study groups, and a Telecommunications Standardization
Bureau headed by an elected director. World telecommunications
standardization conferences are held every four years, but additional
conferences may also be held. The conference considers specific questions
addressed to it by the Plenipotentiary Conference, or other conferences or the
Council and, in turn, creates telecommunications standardization study groups
to prepare draft recommendations on the questions. A chairperson and one or
29. Id. at ch. I, art. VIII., §1, reprinted in CONSTITUTION AND CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, supra note 28, at 26.
30. Id. at ch. I, art. 11, § I, reprinted in CONSTITUTION AND CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, supra note 28, at 26.
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more vice-chairpersons may also be assigned. The world telecommunications
standardization conference can approve, modify, or reject the draft
recommendations produced by the study groups.
Since study groups are typically large, it is not possible for them to meet
regularly or arrive at decisions in an efficient manner.3 Study groups normally
meet only twice between their formulation and the next Plenary Assembly when
their final reports are due." The work of the study group is normally carried
out through correspondence. To provide for closer interaction than this process
would allow, the study group typically sets up more compact working parties
to study more technical questions. Joint working parties may also be formed if
the question under consideration deals with more than one study group. When
either the parent study group or the working party find it desirable, Special
Rapporteurs may also be appointed to lead discussions on a particular question.
The rapporteur chooses a small set of collaborators and a means of
communication-correspondence or face-to-face meetings-suitable for all the
concerned members. The Special Rapporteur presents a consensus document
to the working party.
After each meeting of the working party or study group, a report is
submitted to the Secretariat detailing the work done so far. Near the end of the
study period, the working groups submit their report in the form of draft
recommendations to the study group. Ifthe working group is not able to arrive
at a consensus, all the opinions are included in the report as divergent proposals
or points of view.
In turn, the study group has the responsibility to submit their final
recommendations at least four months before the beginning of the next Plenary
Assembly. Along with this report are included a list of questions that the study
group thinks deserve further study during the next study period. These
recommendations and questions are circulated to all the members attending the
Plenary Assembly, so that they have adequate time to consider them and
formulate a position. At the Plenary Assembly, study group recommendations
are put to the vote, and are accepted if they receive a majority of the votes.
Each national delegation can exercise only one vote. Ifa vote is not unanimous,
31. MACPHERSON, supra note i5, at'9 (providing a detailed description of the activities of study groups
in the ITU).
32. The sectoral conferences were called Plenary Assemblies before the ITU Constitution was amended
at the Plenipotentiary Conference at Kyoto in 1994.
1998] 727
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
the majority and minority along with abstentions are recorded, but not the
identity of the delegations which voted for or against the proposal.
ITU recommendations do not have the force of international treaty, but are
only expert opinions. In some cases, the consultative committees may not be
able to arrive at a decision about a standard; under those circumstances, a
compromise document is produced essentially giving international sanction to
two or more conflicting standards. Here, the ITU does not make a
recommendation, but produces its study results as a "multiple standards report."
Member states are then free to choose the standards they deem fit for their own
telecommunication systems.33 However, this happens rarely, and only in
situations where the adoption of a standard is perceived as crucial for national
interests. The adoption of multiple color television standards (the American
NTSC, the German PAL, and the French SECAM) was one case in which
consensus was made impossible by the conflicting economic interests of the
main negotiating parties.34
The elaborate and time-consuming process described above had evolved
over a period of more than a hundred years, and was a product of the ITU's
history. One reason for building detailed procedural requirements into the ITU's
standard-setting was to include as many interested parties as possible in
decisionmaking and to accommodate a wide diversity of alternatives. Often,
this led to unacceptable delays in setting standards, but it was acceptable in the
slower-paced days of conventional technology.
For reasons mentioned in Part III, this cumbersome process has been
deemed inadequate for the changed requirements of the new telecommunications
age. Consequently, a number of modification have been proposed in the ITU's
standard-setting procedures. As early as 1972, the international consultative
committees were authorized to issue "provisional recommendations" on
standards, when circumstances suggested that the final recommendations would
take a long time to evolve. This was an unsatisfactory solution. States did not
want to make their adoption decisions based on provisional recommendations
that were subject to change.35 Another alternative involved issuing multiple
33. SAVAGE, supra note 22, at 3 1.
34. Id.
35. Under these circumstances, a state that took an early adoption decision could be isolated in a
"standards island" ifthe rest of the international community decided to favor a competing standard in the final
decisionmaking stage. On the other hand, a state that adopted a standard early preserved its freedom of choice
and could put pressure on the international community to legitimize its choice in the final adoption decision.
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standards. This in effect legitimized a system in which conflicting standards
coexisted.36
In the 1980s the ITU was brought face to face with the necessity to
coordinate its activities with other standard-setting organizations. The emerging
convergence between data processing and telecommunications was a prime
motivating factor for this change. It became necessary to decide who had
jurisdiction over the new technologies. This was complicated by the fact that
different international organizations had differing definitions for even basic
concepts like "software" and "telecommunications." For example, these
jurisdictional issues arose in the case of standard-setting for ISDN, where
overlapping ISO, IEC and CCITT jurisdictions could be perceived." "There
was not even agreement whether a new technology was a 'service', a 'concept'
or a 'device."'38 Eventually, these conflicts were resolved through informal
discussions. A CCITT-ISO/IEC collaboration framework was established at
the 1984 Malaga-Torremolinos CCITT Plenary in anticipation of future
jurisdictional problems.
Second, acknowledging the growing importance of "non-Administration
entities and organizations" in radiocommunication, standardization, and
development sectors, the ITU decided at the 1994 Kyoto Plenipotentiary
Conference to give formal recognition to the rights these agencies had enjoyed
so far in practice. Approximately 325 telecommunications service providers,
equipment manufacturers, and user groups can now participate formally in ITU
sectors.39
A third change that has come about recently in the ITU is the assignment
of responsibility for the implementation of ITU decisions to more permanent
and better coordinated wings of the ITU.4 In the past, the main decision
making body of the ITU was the Plenipotentiary Conference. Implementation
was primarily the responsibility of the member administrations themselves. In
1995, at Kyoto, the ITU decided to give the main responsibility for the
implementation of its decisions to the permanent Secretariat, with the ITU
Council having broad oversight authority. The significant fact here is that the
36. SAVAGE, supra note 22, at 170.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 171.
39. Donald J. MacLean, A New Departure For the ITU: An Inside View of the Kyoto Plenipotentiary
Conference, 19 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 177, 179 (1995).
40. Id.
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ITU Council is a smaller forty-three member body that meets every year,'
compared to the full-member Plenipotentiary Conference that meets every four
years. Also, by increasing the responsibilities of the Secretary-General, the
Kyoto Conference placed implementation with a permanent body, as opposed
to the disjointed and uncoordinated efforts of the national administrations.
Through these measures, the ITU was recognizing the importance of smaller,
better coordinated and faster-acting bodies in international telecommunications.
Fourth, the Administrative Plenipotentiary Conference (APP) in 1992 had
created a constitutional duty for the Directors of the Radio communications,
Standardization, and Development Bureaus to cooperate with one another. 4 The
Kyoto conference also emphasized this theme by passing resolutions that
required the cooperation of all three Sectors. This has been called a "break with
ITU tradition" in which wings of the pre-1992 ITU "tended to operate
independently, in keeping with their independent origins and the federal nature
of the organization."43
Another innovation the Kyoto conference brought about is improved
electronic access to ITU documents and publications. Earlier ITU members had
communicated with each other and with the international committee via regular
mail, which delayed the standard-setting process by months and years. By
circulating documents electronically and by improving public access to
documentation and publications, the ITU hopes to speed up international
consultation on standards." There are indications that these ITU strategies are
proving effective. The same amount of work in standardization was done in the
four year period in 1988-1992 as in the previous twenty years without
additional resource allocation. 4  This was achieved purely through a
reengineering of the standard setting process.
41. Convention of the International Telecommunications Union, reprinted in CoNsTrrtrroN AND
CONVENTION OFTHEINTERNAIONALTELECOMMUNICATIONSUNION, supra note 28, at ch. I, art. IV (51) (2), §2.
42. For example, ch. III, art. xvii, § 105 of the ITU Constitution states that: "The precise responsibilities
of the Telecommunications Standardization and Radio communications Sectors shall be subject to continuing
review, in close cooperation, with regard to matters of common interest to both Sectors, in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Convention. Close coordination shall be carried out between the
Radiocommunication, Telecommunications Standardization, and Telecommunications Development Sectors."
Constitution of the International Telecommunications Union, supra note 28, at ch. ll, art. xvii, § 105.
43. MacLean, supra note 39, at 183.
44. Id. at 184.
45. Id. at 186.
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B. Standard-Setting in RSOs
In the above paragraphs, the standard-setting process in the ITU was
considered at some length. We can now turn to a consideration of the
standardization processes in some of the ITU's competitors. I have discussed
three: Japan's TTC, the European ETSI, and the IEEE. As mentioned before,
these three organizations, along with the ITU, represent all major categories of
standard-setting bodies. The Japanese TIC is a national-level agency, the ETSI
is a regional standards organization, and the IEEE is an international
professional association.
1. Japan's Telecommunications Technology Committee
The Telecommunications Technology Committee (TTC) is a private
standardization organization in Japan.' It was founded in 1985 as a voluntary
organization, with its membership rolls open to domestic and foreign agencies
alike. Its mandate includes standard-setting for interconnection between
telecommunications networks, between networks and equipment, and between
different types of equipment. Membership is divided among four categories:
Type I telecommunications carriers (facilities-based); Type II carriers (non-
facilities-based/leased-line carriers); manufacturers; and user groups."7
The drafting of telecommunications standards is done primarily under the
leadership of the Technical Assembly of the TTC. The Technical Assembly is
assisted by six subcommittees and a number of working groups. Draft
standards prepared by working groups are submitted to the relevant
subcommittee and then to the Technical Assembly for final approval. On
approval, the recommendations are published as draft voluntary standards.
Though these standards are voluntary, there is tremendous pressure within the
46. On the government side, the Communications Standards Bureau of the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT) and the Telecommunications Technology Council are the agencies primarily
responsible for standardization. STANLEY M. BESENTELECOMMUNICATION AND INFoAmAnoNTENoLOGY
STANDARD SETTiNG iN JAPAN: A PRELIMINARY SuRVEY 3 (1991).
47. Id. at 1, 6.
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industry to ensure conformity because TTC standards deal primarily with
interconnection. 8
The TTC's decisions are made either by consensus or by a weighted voting
procedure. Consensus is the desired means of decisionmaking, but in cases
where consensus is either not possible or too time-consuming, the Committee
may vote. The rules for voting are elaborate. Each membership group of the
TTC is allocated a fixed number of votes.49 In each group, individual voters
have a fraction of the total votes of their group depending upon the total dues
paid by them and the number of members in their group. The formula allocates
more votes to organizations that pay more dues, but not as a direct proportion.
To adopt a standard requires two-thirds of all votes. Thus, the voting procedure
requires a substantial amount of support from the participants, though it can
often bypass gridlock resulting from a process based on full consensus.
2. European Telecommunications Standards Institute
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was
established in March 1988 by the European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) to streamline and accelerate the
standard-setting process at the European level."0 While CEPT membership is
limited to European PT&Ts, the ETSI is open to PT&T administrations, public
and private telecommunications companies, manufacturers, user groups, and
research establishments from all the member countries of CEPT. However,
while all members can participate in deliberations, these members are grouped
into national delegations for voting.5'
The main organs of the ETSI are the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the
Technical Assembly, Technical Committees, and Project Teams. 2 The General
Assembly is responsible for the administration of the Institute and chooses the
Director, under whom the Secretariat functions. ETSI standard-setting
activities are carried out under the direction of the Technical Assembly, which
is comprised of Technical Committees and Project Teams. The Technical
48. Id. at 5-6.
49. See id. at 6-7. The allocations are as follows: Group I (Type I telecommunications carriers) 100,
Group 11 (Type II telecommunications carriers) 50, Group III (Manufacturers) 100, and Group IV (Users) 50.
50. STANLEY M. BESEN, EuROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INSTTUTE: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIs 1-2 (1991).
51.Id. at2.
52.1d.
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Committees and Project Teams are technical bodies. The Project Teams are
responsible for developing standards, and presenting them to the Technical
Committees, which then pass them on to the Technical Assembly as draft
standards for approval. The ETSI furnishes only a part of the budget for the
Project Teams, the rest comes from the companies or administrations whose
representatives are members of the Project Teams.53
Like Japan's TTC, the ETSI allows decisionmaking either by consensus,
or by voting. However, consensus is the preferred means of decisionmaking.
Like the TTC, the ETSI follows a system of weighted voting, but with the
crucial difference that national delegations exercise their votes en bloc, and not
as individuals. Each country is given a number of votes, with the larger
economies having more votes than the smaller ones. A standard gets approved
if it obtains seventy-one percent of the total votes.
3. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IEEE was formed in 1963 by merging the American Institute of Electrical
Engineers and the Institute of Radio Engineers. It is an Accredited
Organization of the American National Standards Institute that develops
American national standards.' IEEE procedures encourage participation by
individuals rather than organizations. Standardization is initiated by a study
group comprised of individuals who were involved in the creation of a
technological innovation. Once the study group recommends a standard, a
Standards Committee, under whose area of expertise the standard falls,
sponsors the formation of a working group. The working group evolves a draft
standard and submits it to the Standards Committee for balloting. The voting
process is called the sponsor ballot. Any IEEE member can request the IEEE
Standards Board for inclusion in the balloting body. Non-members and
organizations can also petition the Standards Board for voting rights. This
ensures that all affected or interested parties can participate in the creation of
a standard.
The IEEE balloting procedure follows a consensus process, which allows
considerable modification of the draft standard. The sponsor ballot is usually
a three day mail ballot. Eligible members may vote for or against the proposed
53.Id. at3.
54. Roy Rada et al., ITStandards Development and Consensus: Three Case Studies, STANDARD VIEW,
March, 1994, at 50-51.
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draft, or abstain from voting. Votes against a proposal must be accompanied
by detailed comments on the desired changes. Once these changes are
incorporated in the draft, the negative vote is automatically reversed. All
unresolved negative comments are circulated to the members by mail, upon
which the voters have the option to change their votes. After ten days of the
recirculation, it is assumed that a failure to respond amounts to an unchanged
vote. Under this process, a draft may pass through several stages until
consensus is achieved. The duration of this process is reduced by electronic
circulation and free print distribution of all reports and comments.
Once a draft standard passes the sponsor ballot after modification, it is
submitted by the Standards Committee to the IEEE Standards Board for
approval. At this stage the working group is dissolved. The IEEE Standards
Board authorizes the standard on the recommendation of the Standards
Committee. Since the IEEE is an Accredited Organization of the ANSI, many
IEEE standards may become American National Standards eventually.
Even after the standard is approved by the IEEE Standards Board and the
working group is dissolved, the original study group that recommended the
creation of a standard may remain active in extending and refining the standard.
After a few years, a working group may be reconstituted to revise the standard.
VI. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section, I intend to reexamine Besen and Farrell's prediction about
the eclipse of the ITU as an international telecommunications standard-setter.
Their contention was that the ITU's inferiority in its procedures was shifting the
advantage in standard-setting to newer, leaner organizations more capable of
functioning in the new technology era. Besen and Farrell's criticism hinged
around three points: the new standards organizations have decisionmaking
procedures that are better suited to the new telecommunications environment;
the ITU's members, namely national governments, are no longer the sole
stakeholders in international telecommunications; and smaller and more
homogeneous organizations are able to make decisions more efficiently than
larger organizations."5 I examine each of these points, especially in the light of
reforms in the ITU's functioning initiated by the 1994 Kyoto Plenipotentiary
Conference.
55. Besen & Farrell, supra note I, at 311-12.
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To take up the first point, the ITU's decisionmaking in the past has been
marked by inordinate delays and wasted resources. However, a comparison of
the ITU decisionmaking process with that of its competitors reveals a close
parallel in the consultation and drafting stages of the process. In the ITU, as
well as in the TTC, the ETSI, and the IEEE, consultation and drafting takes
place within small technical committees, with the recommendations reviewed by
one or two higher levels before being presented to the highest decisionmaking
body. In the case of the ITU, the highest decisionmaking bodies are the sectoral
world conferences, formerly the plenary assemblies of the International
Consultative Committees. The crucial differences between the ITU and the
other bodies become apparent in the decision initiation and approval stages. In
the ITU, the authority to initiate "questions" for discussion by the study groups
and to approve draft recommendations prepared by the study groups rested with
the plenary assemblies, now the sectoral world conferences. In fact, ITU study
groups and working groups can be established only by the plenary
assemblies/world conferences. Since the plenary assemblies formerly met only
once every four years, the ITU's decisionmaking process in the consultation and
drafting stages must follow this schedule. This is a major weakness of the ITU
process.
There are some indications that the Kyoto Plenipotentiary Conference was
cognizant ofthis problem. For example, sectoral world conferences meet more
frequently than the plenary assemblies they replaced. The Kyoto
Plenipotentiary Conference also allocated the responsibility to implement ITU
decisions to its permanent Secretariat. However, without a full-time standards
approval body like the ETSI's Technical Assembly, the work done by the ITU's
technical bodies will be wasted.
The second point of criticism raised by Besen and Farrell is that the
primacy of national PT&Ts in telecommunications is coming to an end, and
with it the importance of the ITU as a standard-setting body. In contrast to the
ITU, the TTC, ETSI, and IEEE allow a much wider range of organizations and
individuals to be part of their decisionmaking process, including non-facilities
based service providers, private network operators, manufacturers, technology
user groups, and even individuals with no organizational affiliation. According
to Besen and Farrell, the wider circle from which the new standard-setting
organizations draw their membership is a strength that the ITU lacks.
This statement is questionable. First, participation alone does not give
members the ability to influence decisionmaking. Participation in standard-
setting is a resource intensive activity in terms oftime, money, information, and
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effort. Accordingly, "people who have the backing of large organizations are
more likely to afford active membership." 6 Through their nominees, large
organizations like national PT&Ts, the Recognized Private Operating
Institutions and Scientific and Industrial Organizations will continue to
influence standard-setting processes. All of these organizations have
participated in ITU decisionmaking in the past, though under the aegis of their
respective national governments.
Recently, the ITU has taken several steps to increase the role of the private
sector in its activities. The Union's Strategic Plan unveiled at the 1994 Kyoto
Plenipotentiary Conference specifically recognizes that "the restructuring of
telecommunications which is taking place in many ITU member countries is
transforming what was a public service monopoly into an increasingly private,
competitive business."57 At Kyoto, the ITU also decided to formalize the rights
currently enjoyed in practice by non-Administration entities and organizations,
which included telecommunications providers, manufacturers, and user groups.
Third, Besen and Farrell argue that smaller and more homogeneous
organizations are more capable of making decisions faster and more efficiently,
than large international organizations like the ITU. In one sense, RSOs
discussed in this article are more heterogeneous because they draw their
membership from a more diverse pool including service providers, equipment
manufacturers, and consumer organizations. In another sense, they are more
homogeneous because these members are based in a much smaller geographical
area and belong to national telecommunications systems at roughly the same
stage of development. Besen and Farrell cite this homogeneity as a reason for
the greater decisionmaking efficiency of RSOs.
However, the purpose of standardization is not just to arrive at a standard
by the fastest or most efficient means, but to have the standard accepted by the
widest possible number. In areas like standardization, where there is no
compulsion for individual users to adhere to a particular standard, it is often the
stature of the standard-setting organization that determines the level of
acceptance that a standard will receive. Though it is true that superiority in
technical and operational features may help consumers make up their minds,
conflicts in standardization often occur in areas where there is no clear-cut
technological champion.
56. Rada et al., supra note 54, at 53.
57. MacLean, supra note 39, at 182.
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The international community is still searching for an organizing principle
that can confer legitimacy on the decisions of collaborative bodies in the
globalizing world. In the nation-state system, the legitimizing principle was
provided by the ideal of state sovereignty and international bodies like the ITU
gained their legitimacy through near-universal participation by the states. The
proponents of globalization argue that the nation-state is increasingly under
attack. In international telecommunications standardization, the rise of regional
standards organizations as challengers to the ITU signify that this may indeed
be so.
If the nation-state system is in decline, there is no consensus among
advocates of globalization on a legitimizing principle to replace state
sovereignty. The unfettered operation of the capitalistic market-system or
broad-based participation in a global civil society could be legitimizing
principles. Supporters of the market principle will argue that markets are by
nature self-regulating and self-perpetuating and that unrestricted market
operations will always produce the best result. On the other hand, supporters
of the global civil society principle will argue for broad-based participation by
non-governmental organizations, consumer groups, and public spirited
individuals in all decisionmaking.
In the case of the regional standards organizations, there is no evidence that
either of the two legitimizing principles will apply. First of all, the decisions of
regional standards organizations are closely identified with the strategic trade
policies of their parent regional blocs or national governments. As international
trade becomes increasingly competitive, allegations are only going to increase
that standards are being used as non-trade barriers. In this context, RSOs
cannot claim legitimacy as the representatives of market forces. On the other
hand, while RSOs have broader participation from different categories of
individuals and organizations in their decisionmaking than the ITU, their
membership is typically drawn from a sharply defined geographical area. Thus,
RSOs are not more inclusive and participatory, but distinctly less so than
traditional standard-setting organizations. In terms of participation too, RSOs
cannot claim to be globally representative institutions.
Under these circumstances, the ITU's longer history, larger size and global
reach give it a legitimacy that the regional standards organizations simply lack.
As regional trading blocs become more and more common, and standardization
becomes a part of strategic trade policies, only global fora like the ITU can
fulfill the need for globally acceptable standards. However, RSOs remain
important. In the future, we may witness a standardization regime in which the
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efficiency and speed of smaller standard-setting organizations is matched with
the legitimacy of large international organizations like the ITU. Indeed, there
are indications that such a symbiosis is already developing between the ITU and
RSOs. As some observers point out, "the technical expertise and superior
decision capacity of the regional organizations is traded for the generality that
the CCITT can offer with its membership coming from all over the world." 8
If the ITU places its decisionmaking process on a more continuous basis
between sectoral world conferences, and takes steps to coordinate efforts with
other standard-setting bodies, it would seem that the ITU's place in international
telecommunications standardization is assured well into the next century.
The need to find a legitimizing principle for global collaborative decisions
is not confined to international standardization alone. As the world grows
increasingly integrated, the question of the legitimacy of global decisionmaking
is likely to figure prominently with policymakers and citizens everywhere.
58. Philipp Genschcl & Raymund Werle, From National Hierarchies to International Standardization:
Modal Changes in the Governance of Telecommunications, 13 J. PUB. POL'Y 203, 219 (1993).
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